Military trade unions:  a threat to national security … really? by Heinecken, Lindy
140 
 
MILITARY TRADE UNIONS:  






The opinion piece by Eric Z. Mnisi claiming that national security has been 
sacrificed at the altar of soldiers’ constitutional rights to form and join trade unions 
is a claim often muted, not only in South Africa but elsewhere. In the Handbook on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel, it is stated 
that, “unionization of military personnel is seen as conflicting with the unique nature 
of the military and its role in maintaining national security and public order”.1 This 
of course is not a new debate and is highly contested.  
During the seventies, this was a heated topic when both the United Kingdom 
and United States of America faced the prospects of military unionism. At the time, 
similar claims were made that military unions will subvert military discipline and 
obedience,2 disrupt the chain of command by 
creating an ‘us–them’ situation, and 
undermine unit esprit de corps3. This was 
refuted by countries with a long-standing 
tradition of some form of military unionism. 
Countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
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the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, reported many positive benefits 
of having military personnel belong to associations and unions.4 
So why the concern? Is South Africa a unique case to the extent that it is 
justifiable to restrict or revoke the rights of military personnel? What evidence exists 
to support the claims of a security threat, or is this just a fallacy? The purpose of this 
contribution is to debunk some of the claims in order to place the arguments against 
military trade unions in context. To do so it is necessary to briefly explain why 
certain countries, such as South Africa, have ended up having military unions. 
Specifically in the post-Cold War period, this is not a rare phenomenon.5 Following 
this, the various debates related to military unions and national security, as well as 
the effect on military discipline and the chain of command are deliberated. In 
conclusion, I reflect on whether the demise of military unions is a democratic 
imperative, rather than a threat to national security.  
Reasons for unionisation 
In terms of the right to belong to a trade union, the first issue at stake is that 
all citizens in democratic countries have the freedom to associate and assemble, 
including the right to protest. These are fundamental rights recognised in virtually 
all human rights treaties and enshrined in the South African Constitution. The 
challenge, however, is how to balance these rights without undermining the needs of 
the military in terms of loyalty, obedience and political subservience, given their 
unique nature, function and role in society. Given the many differences between 
countries, various forms of collective associations and unions have emerged to 
ensure that the human rights and welfare of military personnel can be 
accommodated, without undermining military effectiveness or national security. 
However, not all countries have faced the prospect of military unionism. Some have 
been able to circumvent trade unions by creating alternative models of dispute 
resolution, such as in Canada and the United States.6 Others, such as South Africa, 
despite attempts, have been unable to parry the union challenge.7  
Typically, where some form of military unionism exists, it is in countries 
whose governments have come into power on the back of a strong labour movement 
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6 Farley, K, Walker, R & Mendoza, D ‘Freedom of Association and the Canadian Forces: 
Current Status and Future Trends’ in Bartle & Heinecken op cit 67–82. 
7 Bartle & Heinecken op cit. 
142 
 
and who have a socio-democratic political orientation. Where this is the case, labour 
rights are typically extended to the military, but only after these rights had been 
granted to the public service and police. South Africa has followed a similar pattern 
in terms of the extension of labour rights to the military. However, this alone does 
not explain the emergence of trade unions. There must be a mood, motive and 
opportunity to unionise. International experience indicates that where military 
personnel have perceived a decline in their relevance and status in society and a 
disinvestment of government in the military, unions are likely to emerge. This 
explains in part why one sees a sudden upsurge in military personnel demanding 
some form of collective representation in recent years.8  
In the post-Cold War period, the implementation of neo-liberal public 
management principles aimed to cut state expenditure led to the erosion of military 
budgets, downsizing and rightsizing of the military, employment contracts of the 
military, and service conditions and tenure. Military leadership had no choice but to 
accept this, giving rise to widespread discontent and insecurity. Other societal trends 
too have contributed to the demand for some form of collective representation. This 
includes a rights-based culture, a rise in individualism, a change in the acceptance of 
authority and discipline, and in recruitment. Many joining the military today come 
from social classes where unionisation is long entrenched and where military 
employment is seen as a job, rather than a calling.9 This has been the case in South 
Africa too. Countries that have also recently seen the emergence of some form of 
collective representation are the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, Poland and Slovenia.10 Many of these countries could not previously unionise 
as the ‘legal’ opportunity did not exist to allow this. It was only in 2014 that the 
European Court on Human Rights ruled that a blanket ban on military trade unions 
is illegal.11 In South Africa, these rights were extended to military personnel by the 
Constitutional Court in 1999. 
Threat to national security 
This brings us to some of the concerns that the formation of military unions 
evoke. Contrary to popular perception, it is not strike action but the alliance of 
military leadership with the military unions that poses the greatest threat to civil–
military relations, and national security. Although members of military associations 
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and unions often protest, few have ever gone on strike. According to Caforio,12 of 
far greater concern is where military leadership aligns themselves with the unions 
that an unacceptable corporative force is produced, which sooner or later opposes 
the government in power. Given the potential implication such intervention may 
have on civilian control over the armed forces, most countries tend to restrict the 
scope and activities of organisations representing military personnel.  
To ensure that the military unions do not disrupt civil–military relations, 
most countries limit the rights of military professional associations and unions. With 
the exception of Austria and Sweden, no country allows military unions to strike and 
limitations are placed on the scope of collective bargaining. Typically, unions are 
unable to interfere in grievances of an operational or organisational nature; activities 
are constrained by normal regulations pertaining to military law and military 
discipline, and in most cases, the military unions cannot represent their members 
directly in grievances. This has ensured that the relationships with the various 
professional associations and military unions are typically cooperative or even 
corporatist. The same restrictions apply in South Africa, but here a distinctly 
confrontational pluralist style of labour relations has emerged.13 
During the early 2000s, as the unions pushed to negotiate on all matters of 
mutual interest, so the relationship became more confrontational. This was 
hampered not only by power struggles between military leadership and the unions, 
but also by decision-makers outside the Military Bargaining Council (MBC), 
including the Secretary of Defence, the Minister of Defence and the Joint Standing 
Committee on Defence.14 Ultimately, this has led to the MBC suspending its 
activities and becoming defunct. The military unions were portrayed as ‘dangerous’ 
and militant.15 With military leadership resolute not to engage with the military 
unions, so grievances mounted. Over 4 000 grievances remained unresolved, and the 
military unions increasingly partook in protest action to make their concerns 
known.16 It was under these conditions that the 26 August 2009 protest or so-called 
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‘strike’ was evoked. The image of the police firing at protesting soldiers, prompted 
calls to ban military unions for the sake of national security.17  
Would this event have happened had the long-standing grievances of 
soldiers been addressed? As Cortright18 aptly states: 
Unions do not create employee grievances, they simply try to deal with them 
and erase their causes. The tensions that threaten military reliability cannot be 
traced to unionisation. They depend on military mission and on command 
ability to meet rank and file needs. Internal effectiveness hinges on the 
decisions of commanders, not labour leaders.   
The solution lies with the ability of the chain of command and military 
leadership to resolve disputes and address the concerns of military personnel. In fact, 
for more than two decades, the Department of Defence acknowledged that their 
grievance mechanisms were inefficient and that there were no means to monitor the 
resolution of grievances and disputes,19 From this, it is clear that the biggest threat to 
national security is not the military unions, but the poor state of labour relations that 
led to this ‘fortunate’ event. I say ‘fortunate’, because it is this event, which 
ultimately led to the establishment of the Defence Force Service Commission, a new 
grievance procedure and the long overdue establishment of a Military Ombudsman. 
Labour relations in the Department of Defence are certainly in a better place now 
than it was before. 
Effect on military discipline and chain of command 
Another argument raised in the article by Mnisi is the effect that military 
unions may have on military discipline, chain of command and esprit de corps. The 
statement is made “without discipline and coherence within the ranks of the SANDF 
[South African National Defence Force], it will not be able to fulfil its constitutional 
mandate”. Members of the armed forces are subject to a system of military 
discipline, and having unions creates two distinct problems. The first is that raising 
collective grievances is considered equivalent to subordination, especially where 
collective action relates to the questioning of orders, or worse still – mutiny. To my 
knowledge, there is no evidence of this in the SANDF in terms of the involvement 
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of military unions. Neither is there any proof that military unions have disrupted 
vital operations to the extent that it has affected military functioning.  
The second problem relates to the effect of military unions on the chain of 
command. The main concern here is where members act on the instructions of the 
union against the wishes of military leadership. It is difficult to say to what extent 
this has occurred except where members have executed their constitutional right to 
protest. However, what one does see is the emergence of three chains of command, 
which have eroded morale, cohesion, discipline and esprit de corps in the SANDF 
The first is the official ‘bureaucratic’ chain of command, which as indicated has 
been largely ineffective in dealing with both individual and collective grievances. 
This provided fertile ground for unions, and contributed to a lack of trust in military 
leadership to address the discontent within the ranks. The second is the political 
chain of command, run through networks of patronage and favouritism of those 
politically connected or aligned to the ruling party. This has caused widespread 
resentment where it has affected promotion and career progression, and has 
contributed to a culture of mediocrity and decline in professionalism. Undoubtedly, 
this affects discipline and cohesion. The third is the military unions, to whom those 
who have lost trust in the chain of command and who are not politically connected 
resort to address their grievances, unfair labour practices and other injustices. This 
contributes to an unhealthy ‘us–them’ situation, reinforced where the military unions 
emerge victorious in their court cases. 
This is not a healthy state of affairs on all three accounts. The unions alone 
cannot be blamed for this state of affairs. However, their conduct has often not 
endeared military personnel, who want some form of representation but find the 
concept of a professional association more palatable. This is most aptly reflected in a 
letter by Chaplain Treu, who resigned from the South African National Defence 
Union (SANDU) due to the critical stance the SANDU adopted in relation to 
Zuma’s controversial deployment to the Central African Republic.20 In a letter to 
SANDU, Treu stated,  
I expect my union to be engaging with the Minister and the Secretary of 
Defence, lobbying on behalf of soldiers. I expect my union to be in 
discussion with the office of the Military Ombudsman to help define roles 
and perhaps even to forge some kind of partnership. I expect my union to be 
engaging at an academic level with institutions, think-tanks and universities 
where these matters are discussed and researched. I expect my union to be 
presenting papers at academic colloquia and submitting papers to academic 
                                                          




journals. I expect my union to be writing articles in newspapers and online 
forums, specifically to debate defence spending, the state of equipment and 
the service conditions of soldiers. 
This is precisely the role that military unions and professional associations in 
Europe perform. According to Caforio,21 professional associations or unions are 
typically formed to – 
 defend the moral and professional interests of members;  
 enhance the profession in the eyes of the public;  
 inform commanders on personnel problems; 
 collaborate in solving personnel problems;  
 inform members on personnel issues;  
 defend the interests of retired personnel; and  
 participate in bodies for social and cultural promotion.  
However, in reality, most of the professional associations tend to focus on 
the material benefits and well-being of members, rather than defending the military 
profession and institution.22 Consequently, this has led to the blurring of the terms 
used to define military unions and associations, especially where they act in a like 
manner. So, what is in a name? It is what the military union or professional 
association does that is important. 
Conclusion 
As with the private sector, unions are not something that is welcomed by 
employers, even less so by the military. Trade unions essentially strive to defend and 
advance the interests of their members through an ‘active process of collective 
bargaining’ with an employer. Given the structure and function of the armed forces, 
this is fraught with difficulties, especially where the union is seen as an intruder, and 
military leadership continues to manage labour relations from a unitarist 
perspective.23 This is not unique to South Africa. According to Farnham and 
Pimlott, the armed forces have “traditionally tended towards unitary structures and 
consensus values which have generally been accepted by managerial cadres and 
subordinates alike”.24 In the past, military personnel have not felt the need to 
unionise as the state and military leadership have generally tended to the welfare of 
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military personnel. However, this relationship has been eroded as national priorities 
have shifted and the relevance and importance of the military have declined.  
As has been the case elsewhere, organisational and force restructuring, 
coupled with the declining conditions of service, career prospects, tenure, the 
decline in infrastructure and trust in military leadership have all contributed to the 
need for unions. In this regard, the SANDF is not unique. Many other countries have 
faced similar prospects and all have responded in different ways. What is unique is 
that the courts have granted the military trade unions in South Africa quite extensive 
rights, but instead of engaging in collective bargaining or even consultation, the 
military unions have been obliged to rely on the courts to resolve disputes. They 
have won case after case, which has highlighted the plight of soldiers and propelled 
issues into the public domain. Few can dispute that the military unions have brought 
about an improvement in what has otherwise been a defective labour relations 
system. 
Secretly, many support the unions for the ‘watchdog’ role they play, even 
though they may reject or ridicule the conduct of the unions. Whether we like them 
or not, the unions give voice to the concerns of the ‘defenders’ of our democracy. 
They have existed for more than 20 years and it is a fallacy to claim that they pose a 
threat to national security. This exists only in the minds of those who feel threatened 
by the tenacity of the military unions to tackle violations and the abuse of power. 
One merely has to look at how the dismissal of soldiers in 2009 was dealt with,25 
and the Guptagate scandal to understand this tenacity.26 As Duncan (2010) aptly 
points out, the military unions provide an important “safety valve for military 
personnel to speak in an unmediated voice and place a check on the growing culture 
of authoritarianism, corruption and politicisation of the military under the Zuma 
administration”.27  
One can therefore understand why many, closely aligned to the Zuma 
regime and who benefit from this patronage would like the military unions to perish. 
Whether the newly established Defence Force Service Commission (DFSC) and the 
Military Ombudsman will come to obviate the need for military unions is yet to be 
seen. Few can deny that the military unions have come to play an important 
oversight role and one wonders who will hold the Defence Force, its leadership and 
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the politicians to account if this voice too is silenced.28. This is a far greater threat to 
our national security than the military unions.  
                                                          
28 Duncan, J The Danger of a Blindly Obedient Soldier (South African Civil Society 
Information Service, 8 May 2012). 
